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Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice:
Resolving Border Disputes
Jeffrey Fagan
Summary
Rising juvenile crime rates during the 1970s and 1980s spurred state legislatures across the
country to exclude or transfer a significant share of offenders under the age of eighteen to the
jurisdiction of the criminal court, essentially redrawing the boundary between the juvenile
and adult justice systems. Jeffrey Fagan examines the legal architecture of the new boundarydrawing regime and how effective it has been in reducing crime.
The juvenile court, Fagan emphasizes, has always had the power to transfer juveniles to the
criminal court. Transfer decisions were made individually by judges who weighed the competing interests of public safety and the possibility of rehabilitating young offenders. This authority has now been usurped by legislators and prosecutors. The recent changes in state law have
moved large numbers of juveniles into the adult system. As many as 25 percent of all juvenile
offenders younger than eighteen, says Fagan, are now prosecuted in adult court. Many live in
states where the age boundary between juvenile and criminal court has been lowered to sixteen
or seventeen.
The key policy question is: do these new transfer laws reduce crime? In examining the research
evidence, Fagan finds that rates of juvenile offending are not lower in states where it is relatively more common to try adolescents as adults. Likewise, juveniles who have been tried as
adults are no less likely to re-offend than their counterparts who have been tried as juveniles.
Treating juveniles as adult criminals, Fagan concludes, is not effective as a means of crime
control.
Fagan argues that the proliferation of transfer regimes over the past several decades calls into
question the very rationale for a juvenile court. Transferring adolescent offenders to the criminal
court exposes them to harsh and sometimes toxic forms of punishment that have the perverse
effect of increasing criminal activity. The accumulating evidence on transfer, the recent decrease
in serious juvenile crime, and new gains in the science of adolescent development, concludes
Fagan, may be persuading legislators, policymakers, and practitioners that eighteen may yet
again be the appropriate age for juvenile court jurisdiction.

www.futureofchildren.org
Jeffrey Fagan is a professor of law and public health at Columbia University. He thanks Ryan Pakter for excellent research assistance.
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t the outset of the juvenile
court more than a century ago,
juvenile court judges were
given the option to expel cases
and transfer them to criminal
court. Transfer was an essential and necessary feature of the institutional architecture
of the new juvenile court. Indeed, transfer
helped maintain the court’s legitimacy by
removing hard cases that challenged the
court’s comparative advantage in dealing with
young offenders—cases that critics could use
to launch attacks on the court’s efficacy and
therefore its core jurisprudential and social
policy rationales.
Unlike today, though, hard cases in the early
years of the juvenile court did not necessarily involve children charged with murder or
other violence. Rather, the youth who were
expelled more often were thought to be
“incorrigible”—repetitive delinquents whose
failure to respond to the court’s therapeutic
regime signaled the intractability of their
developmental and social deficits.1 Such cases
negated the theory of the court: these youth’s
repeated failures to respond to treatment
canceled their eligibility for protection from
the harmful regimes of criminal punishment.
In fact, for more than five decades, juveniles
charged with murder were more likely than
not to be retained in the juvenile court, beneficiaries of both its diversionary and stigma
avoidance rationales.2
During these years, decisions to transfer
youth to criminal court were made routinely
and almost exclusively by juvenile court
judges with little attention or scrutiny from
legislators, advocates, scholars, or the press.
Their decisions were individualized to the
unique factors for each youth. That is, judges
decided which youth were immature and
“amenable to treatment” on a case-by-case
82
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basis. In some instances, transfer decisions
were based on the severity of the offense,
where principles of proportionality—the
requirement that the punishment fit the
crime—trumped collateral considerations
that might have otherwise mitigated the case
for transfer.
These procedures lasted for decades, until
1966, when the U.S. Supreme Court in Kent
v. U.S. identified constitutionally sanctioned
standards, criteria, and procedures governing
decisions by the juvenile court to waive its
jurisdiction over the offending adolescent.3
Signs of “maturity” and “sophistication” in
the crime were important parts of the Kent
calculus, signaling to the judge that the young
offender posed a danger for further crimes.
Adolescents who were deemed “amenable
to treatment” were retained in the juvenile
court. In deciding whom to waive to the
criminal court and whom to retain in the
juvenile court, judges relied heavily on the
evaluations of social work professionals whose
recommendations on waiver were usually
persuasive and authoritative to the court.
Kent was decided during the mid-1960s,
when both juvenile and adult crime began to
spike in the United States. In reaction to the
sharp rise in crime, many states began in the
mid-1970s to redesign the laws and revise the
philosophy that had long shaped the boundary
between juvenile and criminal courts. Popular
reactions to rising crime and violence shaped
the social and political context of the restructuring, a process that continued through the
late 1990s, when juvenile crime began a
decade-long decline. As adolescents came
increasingly to be feared as perpetrators of
the most serious and violent crimes, the
principles of rehabilitation that were essential
to the juvenile court were largely abandoned.4
Judicial discretion was weakened. In some
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states, judicial authority was replaced with
politically designed sentencing structures that
fixed punishment to crime seriousness.5 In
other states, the decision whether to try a
juvenile as an adult was either shifted to the
prosecutor or was made by legislators who
carved out large groups of youth who were
excluded from the juvenile court.
Demands for dismantling the juvenile court’s
judicially centered waiver regime focused on
four issues: inconsistencies and disparities
from one case to the next, racial biases,
insensitivity by judges to the seriousness of
adolescent crimes, and rising rates of serious
juvenile crime that signaled the failure of the
juvenile court and corrections to control youth
crime.6 The critiques motivated state legislatures across the country to remove judicial
discretion by disqualifying large sectors of the
juvenile court population—children as young
as ten years of age—and removing them to
the jurisdiction of the criminal court.7 The
result was a recurring cycle of legislation,
starting in 1978 and lasting for more than two
decades, that redrew the boundaries between
juvenile and adult court. State legislators
passed new laws and revised old ones, steadily
expanding the criteria for transfer to the
criminal court and punishment as an adult.8
In effect, the legislatures decided that adolescent offenders had become criminally culpable
and more dangerous at younger ages than
they were in the past.
This cycle of legislation also reassigned—from
juvenile court judges to prosecutors, criminal
court judges, legislators, and correctional professionals—a large share of the discretion over
the types of cases to be transferred. Today,
decisions about court jurisdiction sometimes
are made in a retail process repeated daily in
juvenile courts or prosecutors’ offices; at other
times, corrections officials may decide which

youth can be released early and which will
serve the balance of long prison sentences;
and at other times, the choice is made in a
wholesale legislative process by elected officials far removed from the everyday workings
of the juvenile courts.
These choices involve not just two very
different court systems, but deeply held
assumptions about the nature of youth crime,
about the blameworthiness of youth who
commit crimes, and about how society should
reconcile the competing concerns of public
safety, victim rights, and youth development.
The two courts have sharply contrasting ideas
about adolescents who break the law—their
immaturity and culpability, whether they can
be treated or rehabilitated, the security
threats they pose, and the punishment they
might deserve. Whatever the motivation,
sending an adolescent offender to the
criminal court is a serious and consequential
step. It is an irreversible decision that exposes
young lawbreakers to harsh and sometimes
toxic forms of punishment that, as the
empirical evidence shows, have the perverse
effect of increasing criminal activity.9
Nearly four decades after Kent and three
decades after this restructuring began, it is
now possible to look at the results of this
large-scale experiment in youth and crimecontrol policy. In this article I examine the
new boundaries of the juvenile court from
three different perspectives. The first perspective is doctrinal or statutory: what is
the legal architecture of the new boundarydrawing and boundary-maintenance regimes?
The second perspective is conceptual and
jurisprudential: what are the justifications for
the adult punishment of juvenile offenders,
and what do the new boundaries signal about
popular views on youth crime, about the
appropriate responses to such crime, and
VOL. 18 / NO. 2 / FALL 2008
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about the theory of a juvenile court stripped
of its most challenging cases? The third
perspective involves policy. Looking at the
new boundaries from a policy perspective
requires assessing empirical evidence on the
reach, consequences, and effectiveness of
relocating entire groups of juvenile offenders
and offenses to the criminal court. After
revisiting the jurisprudential and policy issues
that are the heart of this debate, I look to the
future of law and policy regulating the upper
boundary of the juvenile court.

Statutory Architecture of
Juvenile Transfer
In the midst of the 1978 New York gubernatorial election, a fifteen-year-old named Willie
Bosket shot three strangers on a New York
City subway platform.10 The horrific murder
evoked a fierce legislative response. The
traditionally shorter sentences in the juvenile
court for dangerous young men like Willie
became the focus of widespread outrage and,
quickly, political action. New York legislators
promptly passed the Juvenile Offender Law,11
which lowered the age of majority for murder
to thirteen and to fourteen for other major
felonies. The new law signaled a broad attack
on the structure and independence of the
juvenile court, a major restructuring of the
border between juvenile and criminal court
that was repeated across the nation in recurring cycles for more than two decades.

Current Boundary-Drawing Regimes
At its birth, the Juvenile Offender Law was,
and remains today, the nation’s toughest law
on juvenile crime. New York State was
already tough on juvenile crime, one of three
states in the nation where the age of majority
was sixteen.12 Two years earlier, it had passed
the Predicate Felony Law, a measure that
mandated minimum terms of confinement
for serious juvenile offenders in juvenile
84
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corrections facilities.13 Determinacy in
sentencing—that is, introducing certainty
both in sentence length and in conditions—
was nothing new for adults, but this law was
the first of its kind for juveniles.14 But the JO
Law, as it came to be known, trumped the
Predicate Felony Law in ways that signaled
the trend that was to come.
First, the legislative branch itself assumed
transfer authority by excluding entire categories of juvenile offenders and offenses
from the jurisdiction of the family court and
removing them to the criminal court.15 The
lawmakers could simply have curtailed the
discretion of family court judges, but the
JO Law foreclosed any role for them. One
reading of the law, then, was as an attack on
the family court and its deep adherence to
the principles of individualized justice and
“best interests of the child.” The JO Law not
only stripped transfer authority from family
court judges, but also devolved it to police
and prosecutors, whose unreviewable decisions about charging young offenders often
determined whether cases met the thresholds
that would trigger a transfer.16
Second, the new law based the transfer decision solely on age and offense. It accorded no
weight to culpability, mitigation, or any other
individual factor, including either therapeutic needs or prior record. It assumed that all
youth in these age-offense categories were
both sufficiently culpable as to merit criminal
justice sanctions and likely to continue their
criminal behavior regardless of any interventions provided for them in juvenile corrections. In effect, the legislators made an actuarial group prediction of future dangerousness.
Third, the new law made sentences for Juvenile Offenders, the label applied to juveniles
whose cases were removed by the law, long
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Table 1. Transfer Mechanisms by State, 2003
Judicial waiver
Discretionary Presumptive Mandatory
Total states
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

45
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

15

15

Direct Statutory
file
exclusion
15

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

25

X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X

17

X
X
X

X

15

X
X

X

X
X
X

34

Criminal
blended

X

X

X

Once adult/ Juvenile
always adult blended
X

X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

29

Reverse
waiver

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X
X

Source: Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws (Pittsburgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2003).
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enough to require trans-correctional placements—placements that began in juvenile
settings and continued into the adult corrections system. Thus the law not only mandated
transfers but made them routine, a move that
affected large numbers of younger offenders
who were sentenced to lengthy prison terms
despite the absence of a prior record.
In the next two decades, every state in the
nation passed legislation to ease and expand
the prosecution of juveniles in adult courts.17
The watershed year was 1995, when seventeen
states expanded eligibility for transfer.18 Most
states supplanted or eclipsed the traditional
system of judicial transfer from the juvenile
court using one or more of the mechanisms
built into the design of the JO Law. Still other
laws created a new statutory authority to
transfer not court jurisdiction but correctional
jurisdiction, and ceded that authority to a
forum that is more administrative than
adjudicative.19 Some states maintained the
structure and primacy of judicial waiver, but
increased the number of youth being waived
by mandating that waiver be considered for
some offense and offender categories and
shifting the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense to show why the accused
should not be transferred to the criminal
court.
Given its scope and reach, the expansion of
transfer for juvenile offenders was a massive
social and legal experiment that fundamentally transformed the borders and boundaries
of the juvenile justice system. The experiment
evolved and strengthened over time: once
passed, laws often were re-crafted in recurring legislative sessions to further expand the
scope of laws to transfer or remove youth to
criminal court at lower ages and for more
offenses. As I show below, the experiment
took on several unique forms.
86
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Mechanisms for Juvenile Transfer
Table 1 arrays the states on each of the
mechanisms of juvenile transfer in effect as
of 2004. Judicial waiver, statutory exclusion,
direct file, and blended sentencing are the
mechanisms used to transfer juvenile offenders to adult court.
Judicial waiver. Judicial waiver to criminal
court is the most common transfer mechanism: forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia provide judicial discretion to waive
certain juveniles to criminal court. Table
2 shows the age and offense thresholds of
waiver eligibility for each state. Historically,
judicial waiver decisions were made following
a motion by prosecutors. Evidence was presented and argued, and a decision was made.
In 1966, in Kent v. U.S.,20 the Supreme Court
articulated both procedural and substantive
standards to regulate judicial waiver decisions. Though only advisory in the original
Kent case, the Kent guidelines quickly were
adopted into law in most states.
Since 1978, judicial waiver criteria and procedures have been redesigned in many states
to increase the likelihood of waiver. Some
states created a presumption of waiver for
specific offenses or offenders, based on age,
offense, or prior record. Presumptive waiver
shifts the burden of proof from the state to
the juvenile to show that he or she should not
be transferred. Other states mandate waiver
for specific categories of offenses and offenders, often to ensure sentencing terms that can
take place only in the criminal court.
Statutory exclusion. Statutory exclusions, like
New York’s JO Law, relocate entire categories
of youth defined by age or offense criteria, or
both, to the criminal court. More than half of
the states have statutes that exclude some
adolescent offenders from the juvenile court.

Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes

Table 2. Eligibility for Judicial Waiver by State, Age, and Offense Type, 2003
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

Any
offense
14
NS

Certain
felonies

Capital
crime

Murder

Person
offense

NS
14

14

14

14

12

12

Property
offense

Drug
offense

Weapons
offense

14

16
12
NS
16
14
15
14
13
14
14
10

15

NS
13

13

14
NS

NS
NS

16

10

14

NS

NS

NS
16

14
14

14

13
14

13
14

NS
15

NS
14
14

13
12
14
15
14

14

14

14

14

14

13
16

16

14
14
NS
15
14
16
14
NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

15

NS

16
14
14

NS

14

14
10

10

10

NS
14

NS
14

NS
14

14
NS
15
13

NS
14

NS
14

Note: An entry in the column below an offense category means that there is some offense or offenses in that category for which a
juvenile may be waived for criminal prosecution. The number indicates the youngest possible age at which a juvenile accused of an
offense in that category may be waived. “NS” means no age restriction is specified for an offense in that category.
Example: In Tennessee, a juvenile may be waived for criminal prosecution of any offense committed after reaching the age of sixteen
(Any offense—16). In addition, a juvenile of any age may be waived for prosecution of first- or second-degree murder or attempted
first- or second-degree murder (Murder—NS). Finally, a juvenile of any age may be waived for prosecution of rape, aggravated rape,
aggravated or especially aggravated robbery, kidnapping, aggravated or especially aggravated kidnapping, or the attempt to commit any
of these offenses (Person offense—NS).
Source: Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws (Pittsburgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2003).

VOL. 18 / NO. 2 / FALL 2008

87

Jeffrey Fagan

Table 3. State Array of Statutory Exclusions of Minors from Juvenile Court by Age and Offense
Type, 2003
State

Any offense

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
California
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Louisiana
Maryland
Massachusetts
Minnesota
Mississippi
Montana
Nevada
New Mexico
New York
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
South Carolina
South Dakota
Utah
Vermont
Washington
Wisconsin

Certain
felonies

Capital
crimes

16

16

15

Murder

Person
offense

Property
offense
16

15
14

15
15
14

16
13
14
13
16

NS
13
14
15
16

16

16

14

14
15
16
16

15
16
14
16

15
16

17
NS
15
13
13
15
NS

17
16

17

14

14

15
15

16
14
16
10

14
16
NS

Drug offense

Weapons
offense

16

15

15
16
16
14

13
16*

15
16
16
16

13

NS

16
16
16

17

17

14

14
16

Note: An entry in the column below an offense category means that there is some offense or offenses in that category that are
excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction. The number indicates the youngest possible age at which a juvenile accused of an offense in
that category is subject to the exclusion. “NS” means no age restriction is specified for an offense in that category.
Source: Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws (Pittsburgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2003).
*In Nevada, the exclusion applies to any juvenile with a previous felony adjudication, regardless of the current offense charged, if the
current offense involves the use or threatened use of a firearm.

Table 3 shows the age and offense threshold
for statutory exclusion in each of those states.
In addition to devolving transfer authority to
prosecutors and police, these statutes also
moot Kent by rendering a legislative judgment
about the future behavior and malleability of
excluded youth. Exclusions vary from specific
offenses, as in New York, to any felony offense
at the age of seventeen, as in Mississippi.
Concurrent jurisdiction and direct file.
Concurrent jurisdiction gives prosecutors the
88
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option and discretion to file cases directly
in adult court. Fifteen states have created
concurrent juvenile and criminal court
jurisdiction for specific categories of offenses
and offenders, permitting prosecutors to
elect the judicial forum for the adjudication and sentencing of the young offender.
Table 4 shows the combinations of offense
and age criteria that trigger eligibility for
concurrent jurisdiction in each state. A quick
glance shows that these statutes are targeted
primarily at violent crimes. Most states with

Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes

Table 4. State Array of Concurrent Jurisdiction Statutes Permitting Direct File by Prosecutor
by Age and Offense, 2003
State

Any
offense

Certain
felonies

Capital
crime

Murder

Person
offense

Property
offense

Drug
offense

14

Weapons
offense

Arizona

14

Arkansas

16

14

14

14

California

14

14

14

14

14

Colorado

14

14

14

14

16

16

16

14

14

14

15

15

15

15

14

14

14

14

12

12

16

16

16

15

15

15

16

15

14

14

14

14

District of Columbia
Florida

16

16

Georgia

NS

Michigan

14

Montana
16

Oklahoma
Vermont

NS
16

16

1

Virginia
Wyoming

14

NS

Louisiana

Nebraska

14

14

14

Note: An entry in the column below an offense category means that there is some offense or offenses in that category that may be
handled in juvenile or criminal court at the prosecutor’s option. The number indicates the youngest possible age at which a juvenile
accused of an offense in that category is subject to criminal prosecution at the prosecutor’s option. “NS” means no age restriction is
specified for an offense in that category.
Example: Wyoming provides for concurrent jurisdiction of the following offenses committed by fourteen-year-olds: any felony committed
by a juvenile with at least two previous felony adjudications (Certain felonies—14); murder or manslaughter (Murder—14); kidnapping,
first- or second-degree sexual assault, robbery, aggravated assault, or aircraft high-jacking (Person offense—14); first- or seconddegree arson and aggravated burglary (Property offense—14).
Source: Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws (Pittsburgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2003).

concurrent jurisdiction make youth eligible at
age fourteen, though others have either lower
or higher age thresholds for specific crimes.
Blended sentencing. Seventeen states give the
criminal court the power to impose contingent criminal sanctions for juveniles convicted
of certain serious crimes; fifteen states permit
juvenile courts to do the same; many give the
power to either court. These statutes, known
as blended sentencing statutes or extended
jurisdiction statutes, identify a specific group
of juveniles—based on age, offense, and prior
record—whose sentences have separate
juvenile and adult components that are linked
through a contingent process to determine
whether the extended (criminal) punishment
will be carried out.21 Typically, the adult
component is imposed only if the youth

violates the provisions of the juvenile portion
or commits a new offense. The conditions in
the juvenile phase may be narrowly tailored
(for example, avoiding subsequent crime) or
vague and subjective (for example, making
satisfactory “progress” in treatment). Table 5
shows the offense and age criteria for blended
sentencing in the states with such provisions.
Two states, Vermont and Kansas, permit
blended sentences for any offense for youth
beginning at age ten. Many other states have
no minimum age for one or more of the
eligible offense categories.
Although intended to ameliorate the consequences of transfer and waiver, blended
sentencing in practice has raised several
issues. First is net widening. In Minnesota,
for example, blended sentences did not
VOL. 18 / NO. 2 / FALL 2008
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Table 5. State Array of Blended Sentencing Statutes by Age and Offense Type, 2003
State
Alaska

Statute
type*
I

Any
offense

Certain
felonies

Capital
crime

Murder
NS

Person
offense
16

Arkansas

I

14

Colorado

C

NS

NS

Connecticut

I

14

NS

Illinois

I

13

Kansas

I

Massachusetts

I

Michigan

I

Minnesota

I

14

Montana

I

New Mexico

E

Property
offense

Drug
offense

14

Weapons
offense
14

10
14
NS

NS

14

14

NS

NS

NS

NS

12

NS

NS

NS

NS

14

14

14

14

10

Ohio

I

10

Rhode Island

C

NS

Texas

C

NS

Vermont

I†

NS

NS

NS

NS

Note: An entry in the column below an offense category means that there is some offense or offenses in that category for which a
juvenile may receive a blended sentence in juvenile court. The number indicates the youngest possible age at which a juvenile committing an offense in that category is subject to blended sentencing. “NS” means no age restriction is specified for an offense in that
category.
*Statute types are coded “I” for inclusive, “E” for exclusive, and “C” for contiguous.
†Vermont has an anomalous juvenile blended sentencing provision, which permits a juvenile entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere in a criminal proceeding to petition for transfer to family court for disposition. Following the transfer, the family court must
impose both a juvenile disposition and a suspended criminal sentence. However, there is no minimum age/offense threshold for
juvenile blended sentencing in such a case—the provision applies to all juveniles transferred from criminal court for Youthful Offender
Disposition.
Source: Patrick Griffin, Trying and Sentencing Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer and Blended Sentencing Laws (Pittsburgh: National Center for Juvenile Justice, 2003).

reduce the number of waivers; instead, they
were given to youth who in the past were sentenced within the juvenile system.22 Second,
the decision to activate the adult portion of
the transitional sentence often lacks procedural safeguards and at times lacks accountability. States vary on whether the decision
is judicial or administrative, as well as on the
evidence necessary to trigger the adult portion of the sentence, on the standard of proof,
on whether youth can contest or rebut the
evidence against them, on whether they are
entitled to representation, and on whether
the decision is reviewable. Given the length
and conditions of the adult portion of the
sentence, a more formal, standardized, and
constitutionally sound procedure would be
appropriate and consistent with the principles
of Gault and McKiever.
90
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Competing Instincts and
Second Thoughts
The complexity of state laws, the piecemeal
character of the statutory landscape, and the
fact that most states have overlapping transfer
mechanisms suggests some ambivalence
about the instincts to get tough by imposing
criminal sanctions on adolescents. Certainly, a
state that really wanted to crack down on
juveniles could simply lower its age of majority. Yet throughout this thirty-year interval of
increasingly tougher sanctions for adolescent
offenders, only two states—Wisconsin and
New Hampshire—have done so, lowering the
age of majority from seventeen to sixteen.23
Between 1989 and 1995, five states abolished
the juvenile death penalty, far more than the
number of states that lowered the age of
majority in the same period.24 And one

Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes

state—Connecticut—recently raised its age of
majority from sixteen to eighteen.

adjudication and sentencing or only for
sentencing within its statutory authority.

Instead, the states have criminalized delinquency incrementally and in pieces, stopping
short of the more obvious and expedient step
of lowering the age of majority. The current
statutory landscape is full of trapdoors and
loopholes that allow some youth—no one
knows exactly how many—to escape the reach
of the criminal law and its harsher punishments. Legislators appear ambivalent,
refusing to completely abandon the principles
of juvenile justice, yet seeking to divide
delinquents into two categories: those worthy
of the remedial and therapeutic interventions
of the juvenile court and those who can be
abandoned to the punitive regime of criminal
justice in the name of retribution and public
safety.

The opposite instinct is evident in the thirtyone states that have enacted “once waived,
always waived” legislation. In these states,
juveniles who have been waived to adult
court and convicted subsequently must be
charged in criminal court regardless of the offense. For example, in Virginia, any juvenile
previously convicted as an adult is forever
excluded from juvenile court jurisdiction. In
California, any youth whose case is waived to
criminal court qualifies for permanent waiver,
regardless of whether he or she is convicted
in the first waived case. Permanent waiver
can be invoked in ten states, and must be
invoked in twelve others, if the offender previously has been adjudicated delinquent.

Two collateral provisions of the new transfer
mechanisms illustrate these competing
instincts about adolescence, youth crime, and
juvenile justice. Viewed together, they
suggest an ambivalent political and social
culture on how tough to get with adolescent
criminals. The first provision is reverse
waiver, the return of transferred cases back to
the juvenile court. Reverse waiver is a retail
corrective mechanism, designed to detect
errors in attributing full culpability or overlooking evidence of amenability to treatment.
Twenty-four states permit reverse waiver
once cases have been initiated in the criminal
courts, including twenty-one of the states
with direct file (or prosecutorial waiver)
statutes.25 In some states with statutory
exclusion, such as Pennsylvania, these
decertification hearings are routine.26 In New
York City, nearly one-third of youth excluded
by statute from family court are returned
there by the adult court.27 Cases can be
returned to the juvenile court either for

Thus, the punitive and child-saver instincts
for youth crime co-exist uneasily in the current statutory environment, forcing a binary
choice between criminal and juvenile court
jurisdiction, a choice that is not well suited to
reconcile these tensions.

The Enduring Importance of Maturity
and Development in Juvenile Justice
What, then, do twenty-five years of transfer
activism signal about legal and popular
notions of the culpability and maturity of
adolescents and about the place of developmental considerations in juvenile justice? The
political discourse and legal mobilization that
animated the criminalization push beginning
in the 1970s was ambiguous about maturity.
From the outside, legal academics read the
movement as a sign that legislators assumed
that young offenders have reached a developmental threshold of criminal responsibility
that makes them fully culpable for their
crimes.28 Indeed, even the Kent regulations
confused “sophistication of the crime” with
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“maturity” and culpability. Critics of the
juvenile court argued that proportionality and
the concerns of victims should trump the
“best interests of the child.” Some argued
that proportionality was necessary to maintain
the legitimacy of the juvenile court.29 Others
recommended a proportionality regime in
the interests of fairness and consistency,
deemphasizing but not discarding the notions
of immaturity and diminished culpability of
adolescents.30 Public safety concerns also
loomed large, with proponents wishing to
draw hard lines to determine when longer,
incapacitating punishments were needed to
protect citizens. Still other critics of the
juvenile court preferred the deterrent effects
of criminal court punishment over a regime
of individualized justice. The notion of
immaturity as a culpability discount was set
aside or standardized in a complex heuristic
of when and for whom transfer is necessary.

execution of adolescents younger than
eighteen who commit capital murder, the
Court took notice that juveniles are less
culpable because they are “more vulnerable
and susceptible to negative peer influences
and outside pressures, including peer
pressure,”33 and are “comparatively immature,
reckless and irresponsible.”34 The sum of
these developmental gaps between adolescents and adults, according to the Roper
majority, “. . . means it is less supportable to
conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably
depraved character.” 35

While the law moves toward
waiving increasingly younger
teens into criminal court,
social and biological evidence
suggests moving in the
other direction.

Accordingly, the transfer activism of the past
two decades did not affirmatively or uniformly reject the notion of developmental
immaturity and diminished culpability of
youth. In many instances, it merely reserved
it for less serious or visible offenders.
Functionally, though not explicitly, transfer
activism assumes that adolescents are no
different from adults in the capacities that
comprise maturity and hence culpability. It
also assumes that adolescents have the same
competencies as adults to understand and
meaningfully participate in criminal proceedings. In the absence of good social and
behavioral science, legislators were free to
make those assumptions.

The Roper court drew both from social
science research and from “anatomicallybased” evidence of “concrete differences”
between juveniles and adults showing that
“critical developmental changes in key brain
regions occur only after late adolescence.” 36
So behavioral science and natural science
are nearly perfectly aligned to show that “the
average adolescent cannot be expected to
act with the same control or foresight as a
mature adult.” 37

But as Elizabeth Scott and Laurence Steinberg show in their article in this volume, there
are good reasons now to doubt these claims.31
For example, in Roper v. Simmons,32 the 2005
U.S. Supreme Court decision banning

The new science of juvenile culpability runs
counter to the patterns in transfer law. In
transfer law, the downward ratcheting of
the age at which youth are exposed to adult
punishment is sharply at odds with evidence
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that full maturity in culpability and blameworthiness comes later than eighteen, not
earlier. The recent push to lower the age
threshold for treating juvenile offenders
as adults assumes that they are sufficiently
mature to be held culpable for their crimes,
that any deficits in their maturity are minor
compared with the harm they have done, and
that unless punished harshly, they are likely to
offend again. The new scientific evidence on
developmentally constrained choices suggests
that the law has been moving in the wrong
direction.38

draw the line at age twelve or younger. One
can hardly expect legislators, prosecutors, and
judges to systematically and accurately make
these complex judgments for young adolescents.41 Getting it wrong has serious costs.
Waiver to adult court is not exactly a death
sentence, but it often is irreversible and has
serious consequences, as I show next, both for
adolescents and for public safety. While the
law moves toward waiving increasingly
younger teens into criminal court, social and
biological evidence suggests moving in the
other direction.

The new developmental and neuropsychological research has strong implications for laws
that funnel adolescents wholesale into the
adult courts. The new evidence casts reasonable doubt on statutes that sweep all fourteen-, fifteen-, or sixteen-year-old offenders
into the criminal justice system. Some adolescent offenders may have reached a threshold
of maturity by age sixteen consistent with the
legal conceptions of maturity-culpability, but
many others have not. In legal regimes that
assume maturity where it simply does not
exist, the new evidence on immaturity, both
in the capacities that comprise culpability and
the brain functions that launch them, argues
persuasively against transfer to the criminal
court.

The Reach of Transfer Law

The alternative to wholesale transfer is to rely
on case-by-case assessments, much as the
early juvenile courts did in deciding which
youth were so incorrigible as to warrant
expulsion from the juvenile court. Yet given
the limitations of prediction, one might worry
about the accuracy of such assessments.39
Developmental variability means that the
younger the line for eligibility for criminal
punishment is drawn, the greater the risk of
error.40 So, for example, the new science
should raise strong cautions about laws that

The complexity of the statutory landscape
challenges efforts to compile accurate and
comprehensive estimates of the reach of
transfer laws.42 Accurate tallies of the number of adolescents transferred to criminal
court would require counts in state court
administrative databases of the number of
cases filed in the criminal court by age, race,
and offense, plus data on their dispositions
to determine how many transferred cases
remain in criminal court after reverse waiver
or judicial review. These data may exist, but
they are highly disaggregated by state and,
in some instances, exist only in local court
records.

How Many Are Transferred?
Estimates of the number of youth tried and
sentenced in the criminal courts are highly
sensitive to data sources and methods of
counting. Donna Bishop estimates that
between 210,000 and 260,000 minors were
prosecuted in criminal courts in 1996.43 Most
of those (80 percent) were excluded from
juvenile courts either by the statutory age
boundary for juvenile court or by statutes that
exclude specific categories of offenses and
offenders. The Campaign for Youth Justice
makes a similar estimate: 7,500 cases are
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Figure 1. Percent of Cases Judicially Waived to Adult Court, 1990–99
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Source: National Center for Juvenile Justice, Delinquency Cases Waived to Adult Court, 1990–99.

judicially waived to criminal court each year,
27,000 are sent by direct file by a prosecutor,
and 218,000 completely bypass the juvenile
system and are sent by legislation that sets
a lower age of adulthood than eighteen.44
Comparing this figure with the estimated
973,000 youth who received dispositions in
the juvenile court in the same year, Bishop
concludes that between 20 and 25 percent of
all juvenile offenders younger than eighteen
were processed in the criminal courts.
These figures are difficult to verify, however.
For example, there are no comprehensive
records of direct file activity by prosecutors.
And records of minors prosecuted in criminal
court are available only for samples from the
nation’s largest counties and only for some
years,45 or from surveys of prosecutors who
report secondary data of uncertain reliability.
These data sources are useful as lead indicators of trends over time, but are not helpful in
generating estimates of the number and rate
of juvenile offenders in the criminal courts.

statistics” on the number of youth judicially
transferred suggest that traffic from juvenile
to criminal court is heavy. For example, the
National Center for Juvenile Justice examined judicial waiver between 1988 and 1999
in more than 2,000 juvenile courts representing 70 percent of the U.S. population. Figure
1 shows that the rate of waiver is low and,
with two exceptions, stable over time.
Approximately eight cases were waived for
every 1,000 formally processed over the
decade, fewer than 1 percent of all cases.
Waiver rates peaked in 1992 at 1.6 percent of
all cases and declined through the rest of the
decade consistent with an overall decline in
juvenile arrests. Person offenses were waived
most often during the decade (1.1 percent of
all formal cases), and property cases least
often.46 Judicial waivers for drug offenses
declined from a peak of 4 percent in 1991 to
slightly more than 1 percent in 1999. Given
the low frequency of judicial waivers, the
attack on the autonomy of juvenile court
judges to make waiver decisions is puzzling.

Although precise estimates may be elusive, it
is possible to verify current estimates by
aggregating other evidence. “Front-end

These front-end statistics on waiver do not
include juvenile transfers to criminal court via
direct file or statutory exclusions, nor those

94

T H E F UT UR E OF C HI LDRE N

Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes

Figure 2. Number of State Jail Inmates under Age Eighteen, 1990–2004
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Source: H. Snyder and M. Sickmund, National Center for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report (www.
ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html [September, 1999]).

minors (as in New York or other states with
age limits below eighteen) who are automatically considered adults by virtue of the state
age of majority. Yet it is difficult to count these
groups. Records often are not kept, and arrest
data rarely differentiate the subchapters in
penal codes that trigger statutory exclusion.
“Back-end statistics” on youth serving sentences in adult jails and prison illustrate the
consequences of all transfer mechanisms.
These data provide a different picture. The
number of youth under age eighteen in adult
jails rose sharply through the 1990s to a high
of almost 9,500 in 1999 and then leveled off to
an average of just over 7,200 since 2000.
Figure 2 shows that between 1990 and 2004
there was a 208 percent increase in the
number of juveniles younger than eighteen
serving time in adult jails on any given day.
The share of youth under age eighteen among
total jail populations, however, is dropping:
these youth accounted for 1.4 percent of the
total population of state jails in 1994, 1.2
percent in 2000, and 1 percent in 2004.47

Figure 3 shows that the number of juveniles
younger than eighteen admitted to state
prisons nationally peaked in 1995 at approximately 7,500 and declined over the next
seven years. The share of these youth among
prison populations is also dropping. Youth
under age eighteen accounted for 2.3 percent
of the total population of state prisons in
1996, more than double the share (1.1
percent) in 2002. Since 1995, the total prison
population has risen 16 percent, while the
number of youth under age eighteen in
prison has dropped 45 percent.48
Finally, in California, 6,629 youth were
sentenced to the California Department of
Corrections between 1989 and 2003 to serve
sentences as adults.49 The average incarceration rate was 475 a year, but varied from a
low of 172 in 1989 to a peak of 794 in 1997.
In 2003, 504 minors were sentenced to adult
prison in California.
Together, these front- and back-end estimates
suggest that the commonly cited estimate that
210,000 youth a year are transferred to
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Figure 3. New Admissions of Youth under Age 18 to Adult Prisons, 1990–2002
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Source: H. Snyder and M. Sickmund, National Center for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report (www.
ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html [September, 1999]).

criminal court50 may be an upper bound. How
much lower the estimate should be is difficult
to determine, and any estimate is prone to
error. What can be said is that there is substantial traffic between the juvenile and
criminal courts, and most of it is one-way. And
the consequences of transfer are severe. Each
year tens of thousands of youth below age
eighteen are newly incarcerated in prisons
and jails, often together with adults, launching
an experience whose irrevocable stigma
clouds their future economic and social lives.
By any measure, this is a large-scale social
“experiment” in youth policy whose effects, as
I show later, are anything but positive.

Race and Transfer
The overrepresentation of minority youth
among those transferred is not surprising,
given their overrepresentation at every stage
of juvenile and criminal justice processing.51
Whether minority youth are overrepresented
relative to their crime rates, and especially
relative to the types of crimes that are enumerated in many state transfer and exclusion
laws, is a more complex question, but the balance of evidence suggests that they are. 52
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Again, the picture of disparity varies at
different stages in the juvenile and criminal
justice systems. A back-end view, for example,
suggests strong disparities among youth
serving in prisons. In 1997, Bureau of Justice
Statistics data showed that between 1985 and
1997, 58 percent of the youth admitted to
state prisons under eighteen years of age were
black and 15 percent were Hispanic.53 The
Campaign for Youth Justice54 cites data from
the California Department of Corrections that
in 2003, black youth were 4.7 times more
likely to be transferred than white youth, and
Hispanic youth 3.4 times more likely. These
populations would include youth transferred
judicially to criminal court, as well as those
excluded by statute under Proposition 21. The
same report cites Virginia Department of
Corrections data from 2005 showing that
black youth comprise less than 50 percent of
youth arrested but more than 73 percent of
youth entering adult prisons.
A front-end view suggests fewer disparities in
waiver. For example, Charles Puzzanchera55
reports that 46 percent of the judicially
waived population during 1990–99 was
non-white. Yet most analysts duck the question
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Table 6. Index of Racial Disparity in the Juvenile Justice System, 2002
Decision points

White

Black

Juvenile arrests

1,576,400

625,000

Cases referred to juvenile court

1,086,700

473,100

Cases detained

199,700

118,600

Cases petitioned

596,800

306,000

Cases judicially waived to criminal court
Cases adjudicated delinquent
Adjudicated cases resulting in placement

4,400

2,500

421,400

179,000

90,400

47,500

Relative rate index

Rates (per 100)
Juvenile arrests to population*

6.1

11.5

1.9

Cases referred to juvenile arrests

68.9

75.6

1.1

Cases detained to cases referred

18.4

25.1

1.4

Cases petitioned to cases referred

54.9

64.7

1.2

0.7

0.8

1.1

Cases adjudicated to cases petitioned

70.6

58.5

0.8

Placements to cases adjudicated

21.5

26.5

1.2

Cases waived to cases petitioned

• For every 100 white youth ages ten to seventeen in the U.S. population, there were 6.1 arrests of white youth under age eighteen.
The rate for black youth was 11.5, yielding an RRI for the arrest decision of 1.9. The black rate was almost double the white rate.
• Except for the adjudication decision point, the RRI shows a degree of racial disparity for black youth. This disparity accumulates
throughout the process, so that in the end, while black youth were 16 percent of the youth population and were involved in 28 percent
of the arrests of youth in 2002, they accounted for 33 percent of the juvenile court cases that resulted in an out-of-home placement.
* Population ages ten to seventeen = 25,994,400 (white) and 5,431,300 (black).
Source: H. Snyder and M. Sickmund, National Center for Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report (www.
ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/toc.html [September, 1999]).

of whether waiver is racially disproportionate
to race-specific crime or arrest rates. Instead,
they more often compute race differences
based on earlier stages of case processing,
mooting the cumulative effects of how youth
of different races enter the system. As part of
the federal Disproportionate Minority
Confinement program, Howard Snyder and
Melissa Sickmund computed a Relative Rate
Index to estimate disparities at each stage of
juvenile justice processing. Table 6 reproduces the chart for 2002 from their most
recent report. Large disparities between black
and white youth are evident at arrest and at
detention. Judicially waived cases show fewer
disparities. But these data are misleading in
two ways. First, they filter out cumulative
disadvantages by race from the outset of a

case in the juvenile court—decisions in
charging, detention, charge reduction, and
the decision to seek waiver itself—and look
only at the decision to waive. This selective
filtering, or “selection bias,” seriously limits
understanding of race and waiver. Second, the
judicial waiver data are likely underestimates
that do not take into account youth excluded
by statute from juvenile court jurisdiction.56 A
more comprehensive data set used by Bishop,
including data on all three routes of transfer,57
reports that 69 percent of the tens of thousands of youth excluded each year by statute
are non-white. No estimate of racial differences in youth crime, apart from homicide,
suggests that minority youth account for such
a large share of crime.
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The Snyder and Sickmund report on judicial
waiver also claims that race disparities are
narrowing. The share of white defendant
cases in juvenile court that were waived
increased from 1990 to 1999 by 9 percent,
while the share for black youth declined by
24 percent. This decline, however, may be an
artifact of the expansion of other pathways for
transfer during this period, an expansion that
may have disproportionately affected minority
youth who were more often arrested for laws
that were the targets of legislative activism.58
The real issue, though, is not whether disparities in waiver exist because minority youth
are more often involved in crime or because
they are arrested at disproportionately higher
rates per crime than are white youth relative
to their involvement in crime.59 Rather, the
essential question about race and transfer is
whether there is disparate treatment given
the fact of contact with the juvenile or criminal court. We might expect more black youth
to be judicially waived or in adult prison relative to white youth if their offending rates are
higher. But disparity might better be viewed
in terms of the balance across racial and
ethnic groups in the rate of transfer relative
to each group’s arrest rate, rather than their
offending rate. This measure is akin to the
ways that epidemiologists compute relative
risk ratios given exposure to an agent.
There are reasons to think that these ratios
are not balanced and that racial disparities in the incarceration of youth under age
eighteen in state prisons cannot be explained
simply by differences in offending. The racial
disparities in incarceration are produced by
the cumulative effects of an entanglement
of discretionary processes at each stage of
the juvenile and criminal justice process.
Analysts consistently find evidence of selective enforcement that targets minorities well
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beyond what any difference in their crime
rates might predict.60 A long line of studies
shows how race influences police officers’
decision making and judgment about suspicion and dangerousness.61 Social science
evidence also suggests the banal, commonplace, and normalized influence of racial
biases in everyday case processing in the
juvenile and criminal courts, much of it
influenced by implicit biases.62 Either directly
or through surrogates and substitutes such as
clothing, demeanor, neighborhood, or other
racialized cues, unconscious and conscious
biases influence decisions about whom to
arrest and how to charge and sentence them.

Either directly or through
surrogates and substitutes
such as clothing, demeanor,
neighborhood, or other
racialized cues, unconscious
and conscious biases influence
decisions about whom to
arrest and how to charge
and sentence them.
Evidence from other corners of criminal
justice also shows the cumulative effects of
racial bias, from which youth are not
exempt.63 Both discretionary and statutory
routes for youth to the criminal court pass
through these gates. Accordingly, disparities
in transfer are the product of a cumulative
process that involves the systematic and
cascading application of discretion across the
juvenile and criminal justice systems, as well
as in structural components created both by
policy and law.
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The Punitive Reach of Transfer
Transfer statutes and policy typically are
designed to increase the certainty, length,
and severity of punishment. Leniency, or
limits on penal proportionality, was one of the
lightning rods for those hostile to the juvenile
court who advocated for tougher measures
for juvenile crime. The evidence, however,
suggests that these advocates only partially
achieved their goals and that they put in
place a far more complex and contingent pattern of sentencing and punishment than they
might have anticipated.

Feld showed that the juvenile’s criminal history often may be unavailable to the criminal
court because of the functional and physical
separation of juvenile and criminal court staffs
who must compile and combine these records
and, sometimes, because of sheer bureaucratic ineptitude.68 As a result, the same
juvenile recidivist who appears incorrigible to
the juvenile court may appear to the criminal
court to be a less chronic and less serious
offender. However, many states have removed
these shields, and juvenile records are now
routinely considered in criminal court.

Several studies illustrate the variability and
contingencies in sentencing of transferred
cases in the criminal courts. For example,
Martin Roysher and Peter Edelman64 showed
in the 1970s that sanctions were no more
severe in criminal court than in juvenile court
in the years immediately following passage
of the JO Law in New York; in many cases,
and in some upstate counties, sentences were
less harsh. Over time, research in different
locales by Kay Gillespie and Michael Norman,
by Dean Champion, and by Barry Feld, all
showed similar patterns.65 Contrary to the
retributive intent of waiver, Marilyn Houghtalin and Larry Mays showed that juveniles
are sanctioned less severely in criminal court
than are their counterparts in juvenile court,
through relatively lenient sanctions and higher
case attrition.66 In 1984 Peter Greenwood and
several colleagues offered several explanations why adolescents might face more lenient
sanctions in criminal court,67 and, based on
recent studies in Florida, Minnesota, and
New York, these explanations seem accurate
today. Young offenders in criminal court may
appear less threatening—physically smaller
and younger, shorter criminal records—than
their older counterparts with longer records.
Moreover, even though juvenile records are
unshielded legally in many jurisdictions, Barry

But more recent studies show that the
leniency gap has been reversed. In the Florida
studies, Donna Bishop and her colleagues
reported that youth charged with violent
crimes were more likely to be incarcerated if
sentenced in the adult court.69 Aaron Kupchik
and several colleagues showed a similar
pattern comparing structured sentencing of
transferred youth in New York with discretionary sentencing of youth in the juvenile
court in New Jersey.70 In many jurisdictions,
structured sentencing determines the disposition in criminal court: the seriousness of a
young adult’s present offense and adult
criminal history are the calculus of sentencing. This is one reason why nearly one-third of
youth aged sixteen and seventeen in New
York with no previous record were sentenced
to adult prison under the New York JO Law.71
This figure reflects the emphasis on violent
crimes in expanded transfer laws and procedures across the states. National trends on
judicial waivers show that adolescents charged
with and waived for violent crimes receive
substantial sentences as adults.72 Local studies
show the same. For example, Cary Rudman
and several colleagues, looking only at
adolescents charged with violent crimes in
four jurisdictions, found that the criminal
court was more punitive.73 The likelihood of
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incarceration was the same in juvenile and
criminal court, but juveniles waived to
criminal court received longer sentences—
almost always in adult prisons—because there
was no upper age boundary for incarceration.
Barry Feld and Marcy Podkopacz found that
waived youth in Minneapolis received longer
sentences for violent crimes, but shorter
sentences for property crime, than retained
youth.74 Fagan, comparing sentences in New
York and New Jersey for offenders aged
fifteen and sixteen in 1981–82, found that
youth adjudicated on robbery or assault in
adult rather than juvenile court were more
likely to be incarcerated and received longer
sentences.75 But in a second study of juveniles
sentenced five years later in the same two
courts, the gap between juvenile and criminal
court sanctions had narrowed significantly.
Thus, the age-offense relationship apparently produces a peculiar disjunction in the
sentences of juveniles as adults. When sentenced as adults, young property offenders
may receive shorter sentences than do their
juvenile counterparts, though young violent
offenders may receive dramatically longer
sentences and under more punitive conditions than do their juvenile counterparts.

Comparative Correctional Experiences
What little research there is on the correctional experiences of transferred youth has
focused on transferred youth who are locked
up in state prisons. Little is known about
the short stays of such youth in county jails.
Nothing is known about how they experience
probation supervision, including whether they
are linked to services that can help them avoid
a return to crime. Nor is anything known
about how youth receiving blended sentences,
or contingent punishment, experience their
two-stage correctional stays. Likewise, for
youth released from prison, little research
1 00
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charts their re-entry experiences and outcomes. More research is needed about all
these areas of transfer policy to fully understand why transfer itself, not just the experiences of the group that goes to adult prison,
seems to produce worse outcomes.

Few modern criminologists
or correctional administrators
maintain the illusion that
incarceration has either
broad therapeutic benefits
or a strong deterrent effect.
As I show later, incarceration does explain the
higher recidivism rates of transferred youth.
Why should their correctional experiences
matter? There are two reasons. The first is
that the primary thrust of transfer laws was to
increase the length and severity of punishment. A serious assessment of transfer as a
policy must engage its retributive component.
One impulse behind transfer activism, fed by
the popular perception that the juvenile
court’s punishment tools were mismatched to
the increasing severity of youth crime, was to
challenge the juvenile court to attain proportionality in the length and severity of its
punishments. A careful analysis of transfer,
then, should consider the quality of retribution and the possibility that, for adolescents,
lengthy stays in harsh conditions of confinement can be disfiguring, with unknown
developmental costs.
Comparisons of juvenile and adult correctional settings suggest that youth in prisons
face higher risks of violence. Martin Forst
and several colleagues showed how the sharp
policy and atmospheric differences between
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the security orientation in adult prisons and
the therapeutic and educational orientations
of juvenile facilities translate into serious
consequences for safety and mental health.76
They compared the experiences of 140 youth
in adult and juvenile facilities over four
locales. Youth in adult prisons reported
higher rates of physical and sexual assault
than did matched samples of youth in
juvenile corrections. Using standardized
scales, youth in juvenile settings reported that
staff was more involved and helpful in social
and behavioral services. They reported
stronger educational programs and employment training and rated therapeutic case
management services higher. They also noted
that staff in the juvenile facilities were far
more attentive to building and strengthening
ties to family and other social networks that
would be influential on release.77 Bishop and
Frazier reported nearly identical responses in
their Florida sample.
In a replication a decade later, Fagan and
Kupchik found fewer differences in victimization than did Forst and his colleagues.78 In
fact, juvenile facilities appeared to be more
chaotic, with higher levels of drug use and
self-reported offending and victimization. But
youth in adult prisons nevertheless felt less
safe and reported significantly more symptoms of mental illness and post-traumatic
stress disorder. Even in the more outwardly
stable contexts of adult prisons, where the
social organization is maintained by rigid
inmate networks, the perceptions and consequences of being surrounded by cohorts
of older, often violent, inmates produced
stronger feelings of insecurity and collateral
mental health consequences.
A second reason why correctional experience
should matter is one of principle. The corrective component of punishment often is

invoked to justify its effects, yet incarceration
seems to have little correctional effect. Few
modern criminologists or correctional administrators maintain the illusion that incarceration has either broad therapeutic benefits or a
strong deterrent effect.79 Recidivism rates in
adult prisons are simply too high—more than
two prisoners in three released in 1994
returned to prison within three years80—to
sustain beliefs in either the rehabilitative or
deterrent component of adult corrections.
What is the principle, and corresponding
youth policy, that mandates exposure to
conditions that are likely to produce failure, a
failure with perhaps lasting impacts on an
adolescent’s social development and wellbeing far into the life course? We already
know that incarceration experiences in
adolescence radically curtail social, economic,
and psychological development over the life
course.81 Do incapacitation or retribution
concerns justify such costs? These policy goals
tell us what to punish and perhaps whom, but
they do not inform a policy of how to punish.

The Public Safety Effects
of Transfer Laws
Research on the deterrent effects of transfer
on public safety focuses on both general and
specific deterrence. Most of the evidence on
general deterrence suggests that laws that
increase the threat of sentencing and incarceration as an adult have no effect on youth
crime rates. Research on specific deterrence
consistently finds that adolescent offenders
transferred to criminal court have higher
rates of re-offending than do those retained
in juvenile court. Rarely do social scientists
or policy analysts report such consistency and
agreement under such widely varying sampling, measurement, and analytic conditions.

General Deterrence
Researchers investigating general deterrence
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typically estimate differences in rates of
offending by adolescents under varying
sanctioning and punishment regimes. Study
designs to test general deterrent effects
sort into two approaches. Most studies use
time series methods, comparing crime rates
before and after the passage of laws lowering the age of majority for specific categories
of offenses and offenders. Others compare
youth crime rates in states with different
statutory boundaries for the age of majority.
Both types of studies often use econometric
models to compare age-specific crime rates
for states with different age thresholds for
criminal court eligibility, statistically controlling also for punishment contingencies and
other covariates of crime and justice system
performance. The evidence tips against the
claim that youthful offenders are sensitive to
the age boundaries that make them eligible
for punishment in the criminal courts. The
consensus cuts across studies that vary in
study designs, time periods, locales, and
methods of analysis.
Most general deterrence studies find that
offending rates among adolescents either
remain unchanged or increase once they
reach age-defined eligibility for the criminal
court. Simon Singer and David McDowall
reported no general deterrent effects when
New York State passed the JO Law in 1978,
despite widespread publicity and enforcement of the law statewide.82 That finding is
surprising, because young people in New
York evidently were well aware of the law, a
fundamental prerequisite for deterrence.83
Nevertheless, the findings were mixed, especially among older cohorts of youth who were
closer to the age of majority. The results were
uneven across the state, as well, with little
effect on youth crime rates in the highercrime areas, including New York City.
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Two other single-state studies—one in Idaho
and one in Washington—reported similar
findings. Eric Jensen and Linda Metsger used
time series analysis to estimate differences
in juvenile crime rates three years before
and five years after Idaho passed a law that
mandated transfer for youth aged fourteen
to seventeen charged with any of five violent
crimes. Juvenile crime rates in Idaho actually
rose after the law was passed, while crime
rates in neighboring states were declining.84
Robert Barnowski used time series models
to estimate changes in juvenile crime rates
before and after passage of Washington’s
1994 Violence Reduction Act and a 1997
amendment expanding the law. He analyzed
juvenile arrest rates for youth aged ten to
seventeen from 1989 to 2000 and compared
state trends with national trends. He found
no differences in the two trends; juvenile
arrest rates for the target crimes peaked in
1994 for each.85
Only one study, by Steven Levitt, reported
that adolescent offenders are sensitive to the
age boundary for adult punishment. Levitt
estimated significantly lower age-specific
crime rates for adolescents between 1978 and
1993 in states where the age of majority was
seventeen than in states where offenders were
eligible for criminal court at age eighteen.86
But the finding was not true across the board:
the effects of jurisdictional age were conditioned on the comparative likelihood of
incarceration in the respective courts. Juvenile
crime rates were lower in states with higher
juvenile incarceration rates, and marginal
increases in the juvenile incarceration rate
had greater leverage on juvenile crime rates
than did the age of jurisdiction. Levitt’s
analysis suggests that strengthening the
correctional response in the juvenile system
can improve public safety without exacting
the social and crime costs of transfer.
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Across all these studies, the great majority
of the evidence agrees that young offenders
seem unresponsive to sharp changes in the
risk of harsher penalties and that the age at
which they are exposed to these penalties
seems to matter little if at all. The appetites
of adolescents for crime and its rewards
seem invariant to punishment threats. David
Lee and Justin McCrary characterize young
offenders as myopic, unfazed by the threat of
short prison sentences and discounting the
consequences and likelihood of longer ones.87
It is hardly unreasonable to assume that
knowledge of changes in the law diffuses efficiently through adolescent peer networks that
are, in effect, information markets to manage
a variety of adolescent risk behaviors.88 Yet
in these highly localized and efficient networks, teens seem to discount changes in the
law’s consequences in a manner that typifies
adolescent reasoning and planning. A generalized change in the risk environment seems
unable to leverage changes in behavior.

Specific Deterrence
As a policy matter, the critical test for transfer
is whether it enhances public safety. Recent
research on transfer suggests that, for youth
with comparable individual characteristics
and correctional experiences, recidivism rates
are either the same or significantly higher for
transferred youth than for youth retained in
the juvenile court. Accordingly, studies on the
specific deterrent effects of criminal court
sanctions show no evidence of public safety
benefits from transfer.
Another single-state study, in Florida, combined age of majority and changes in sanctioning probabilities to estimate the effects of
reaching the age of majority on age-specific
crime rates. Lee and McCrary used panel
methods to estimate the probabilities of
rearrest for a sample of youth arrested before

age seventeen between 1989 and 2002 in
Florida.89 The authors constructed complete
criminal histories going back to the date of
first arrest and tracked them over time,
controlling for punishment experiences.
Again, they found little change in offending
rates once youth turned age eighteen and
faced more severe and longer terms of
punishment as adults. They also found no
effects of transfer to criminal court. They
concluded that none of the mechanisms to
toughen punishment for adolescents—
whether transfer to criminal court, or longer
sentences or even aging out of the juvenile
jurisdiction—show marginal deterrent effects.
The Task Force on Community Preventive
Services, a standing committee including
policy experts from government, academia,
and private research, reviewed seven studies
and concluded that youth transferred to adult
court subsequently commit violent crime at
higher rates than do those retained in juvenile
court.90 Figure 4, which is taken from the Task
Force report, illustrates graphically the range
of the effects of transfer on recidivism in several of the studies. Some studies suggest that
transfer to the criminal court worsens criminal behavior and increases public safety risks.
Again, the consistency of the findings, across
a variety of sampling, measurement, and analytic conditions, is rare in policy science.
The studies typically compared court outcomes and recidivism rates for matched
groups of transferred and retained youth.
Some studies compared the criminal records
of similar groups of youth either from the
same time period or from different time
periods before and after law changes.91
Some studies used designs that are similar to
experiments to compare waived and retained
youth. These designs are approximations of
true experiments, where the youth in juvenile
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Figure 4. Comparison of Effects of Transfer on Recidivism Rates in Five Studies of Specific
Deterrence
Fagan 1996
Violent crime re-arrest rates
in New York City
Podkopacz 1996
Violent felony adjudications
or convictions in Minnesota
Lanza-Kaduce 2002
Felony recidivism rates
in Florida
Myers 2001
Violent felony re-arrests
in Pennsylvania
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Note: Effects of transfer on re-arrests of transferred juveniles. (Results of one other study were not presented here because of complex effect modification by initial offense and other status characteristics.)
Source: For detailed citations to these studies, see Andrea McGowan and others, “Effects on Violence of Laws and Policies Facilitating
the Transfer of Juveniles from the Juvenile Justice System to the Adult Justice System: A Report on Recommendations of the Task
Force on Community Preventive Services,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 56, no. RR-9 (November 30, 2007).

and criminal court are matched on several
factors, such as the number and severity of
prior offenses, and then compared on their
criminal records after they are sentenced
and punished. Other studies compared youth
from adjoining jurisdictions with different
statutes.92 The studies also vary in how they
test the effects of the different court jurisdictions. Most limit their tests to a simple
test of what happens in one court compared
with the other, while some others control
for what court the case is heard in and what
correctional sentence the youth receives. The
outcome measures sometimes are specific
crimes, such as violence or drug offenses, and
sometimes all types of crimes. The studies
vary in the lengths of the follow-up periods,
with some reporting short-term differences
that disappear after several years.93
How confident can we be in these studies
and the conclusions of the Task Force? Some
1 04

T H E F UT UR E OF C HI LDRE N

critics of these studies think that there are
weaknesses in the designs that may undermine the conclusions. For example, most of
the studies introduce selection biases that
prevent a true comparison of the two types
of proceedings and sanctions. That is, the
process of selection for transfer—whether
judicial, prosecutorial, or legislative—may
be based on pre-existing indices for criminal
propensity that may then affect the outcomes. Accordingly, differences in the samples may reflect more about that pre-existing
propensity than about the differential effects
of court jurisdiction. Also, comparisons from
one court jurisdiction to the next may introduce important contextual influences that
may interact with the deterrent effects of
punishment.94
Only a portion of the studies cited by the
Task Force addressed these selection issues.
Two studies of youth in Florida used different
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procedures to control for selection. Lawrence
Winner and several colleagues matched cases
in the juvenile and adult courts on seven
criteria.95 The use of matching routines adds
confidence to these studies and reflects well
on the consistency of their findings with those
of other studies lacking rigorous controls.96
Matches were successful for the first six
variables, but transfers including matches by
race were less successful. Only two-thirds of
the white transfers could be matched to white
non-transfers, and only about half of the nonwhite transfers could be matched to non-white
non-transfers. When the race criterion was
relaxed, successful matches were obtained
in 92 percent of the cases. There were no
controls for court or community context.
Lonn Lanza-Kaduce and several colleagues97
computed a risk index based on twelve items
and used propensity score matching to adjust
for selection effects in the transfer process. He
was able to match 475 pairs overall and 315
“best matched pairs” that excluded transferred
youth whose criminal history was longer or
more severe than a matched contemporary
in the retained sample. The differences in
recidivism rates using these two design strategies produced similar results that both show
substantially higher recidivism rates for transferred youth, particularly in the initial three to
five years following sentencing.
A study by Fagan and another by Fagan and
two colleagues compared recidivism rates
among samples of youth recruited from New
York City whose cases originated in the criminal court with samples from bordering areas
in northeastern New Jersey whose cases were
processed in the juvenile court.98 In each
study, the researchers estimated a selection
parameter, or a “propensity score,” to control
for differences in the samples.99 The propensity score was included as a predictor in the
analyses of recidivism rates.

Even among the few studies that address
selection issues, findings are consistent and
strong. When joined with other studies showing similar findings, they offer robust evidence
of the perverse effects of both wholesale and
retail transfer to the criminal court. Moreover,
these studies reject the notion that these
effects are limited to the subset of transferred
youth who are incarcerated in adult prisons.
Fagan and Fagan and colleagues as well as
Lee and McCrary, specifically test for incarceration effects and find no evidence that
either the fact of incarceration or its length
significantly predicts recidivism. Several other
studies made similar findings. Increasing the
risk or length of confinement offers no return
to crime control for transferred youth.

Summary
In her review of two decades of research
on transfer, Donna Bishop condemns the
“recent and substantial expansion of transfer”
as harmful and ineffective.100 Richard Redding says that “[t]he short-term benefits
gained from transfer and imprisonment may
be outweighed by the longer-term costs of
(increased) criminal justice system processing” from higher recidivism rates.101 Without
exception the research evidence shows that
policies promoting transfer of adolescents
from juvenile to criminal court fail to deter
crime among sanctioned juveniles and may
even worsen public safety risks. The weight
of empirical evidence strongly suggests
that increasing the scope of transfer has no
general deterrent effects on the incidence of
serious juvenile crime or specific deterrent
effects on the re-offending rates of transferred youth. In fact, compared with youth
retained in juvenile court, youth prosecuted
as adults had higher rates of rearrest for serious felony crimes such as robbery and assault.
They were also rearrested more quickly and
were more often returned to incarceration.
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Worse, the broad reach of new transfer laws
and policies captures not only those youth
whose crimes and reoffending risks may
merit harsher punishment, but also many
more who are neither chronic nor serious
offenders, who pose little risk of future
offending, and who seem to be damaged by
their exposure to the adult court. Whatever
the gains of short-term incapacitation, they
are more than offset by the toxic effects of
adult punishment for the larger group of
adolescent offenders.

Principles for Transfer Policy
The proliferation of promiscuous transfer
regimes over the past three decades calls
into question the very rationale for a juvenile
court. The new legislative activism has rolled
back the age at which maturity is assumed
to a threshold that strains the credibility of
the new laws themselves. But there is almost
no evidence that justifies this decades-long
experiment.

Three Strikes against the New Transfer
All scientific evidence suggests that transferring early adolescent youth to adult courts
inverts assumptions about their cognitive
and behavioral capacities before the law and
in nearly every other age-graded social task.
Wholesale transfer laws such as New York’s
JO Law or California’s Proposition 21 assume
a level of maturity and responsibility among
young adolescents that is sharply at odds with
new social and scientific facts. To be sure,
retributive interests benefit from wholesale
transfer regimes, but at the cost of vastly
multiplying the number of individual injustices from proportionality miscalculations.102
The new transfer measures fail to enhance
public safety, despite repeated assertions to
the contrary by prosecutors and legislators.
Instead, prosecuting adolescents as adults, no
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matter what the pathway to adult court, leads
to more, not less, crime, inviting avoidable
public safety risks. More youth, it is true, are
incapacitated for longer periods once in the
criminal court—in many instances, for the
rest of their lives. Yet there is no evidence
that incarcerating minors for any length of
time deters crime either by those locked up
or by others.

Without exception the
research evidence shows that
policies promoting transfer
of adolescents from juvenile
to criminal court fail to deter
crime among sanctioned
juveniles and may even
worsen public safety risks.
Had the large-scale legal mobilization to
increase transfer been subject to federal (and
university) standards for the ethical treatment
of human subjects, it would have been shut
down long ago. One might argue that the
benefits of penal proportionality and incapacitation justify the overreach in moving youth
to adult court, but even here, the calculus
fails. Transfer, whether retail or wholesale,
runs a high risk of exposing to harm not just
its subjects, but also the public that hosts
these measures. These harms are multiplied
by the corrosive effects of a criminal record
on the possibility of reformation or prosocial
development. A transfer regime calibrated
at age seventeen may overreach or underreach at the margins, but transfer policies
that move youth into criminal court at age
sixteen will categorically be overreaching and

Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes

weighted toward over-punishment. These
policies endure in the face of good evidence
of the possibility of such harms, perhaps
animated by deep biases about youth among
legislators if not the public.103 The racial skew
in transfer and its effects, a result in part of
the conflation of youth crime and race in the
popular and political imagination,104 multiplies the ethical tensions in transfer policy.

The Politics of Transfer and the
Politics of Crime
Policymakers have taken notice of the robust
evidence on the negative effects of transfer,
creating a political space for reform as advocates and reformers have pushed back against
expanded transfer. Connecticut passed legislation in July 2007 to raise the age of majority
incrementally from age sixteen to age eighteen
by 2010. In the past two years, legislators in
Missouri, Illinois, and New Hampshire have
had extensive debates over whether to raise
the age to eighteen. Legislators in North
Carolina have convened hearings and formed
a study commission to address this issue.105
The debates focus less on whether to raise the
age than on the strategies and details of how
to do so effectively. The research evidence on
transfer and the decrease in serious juvenile
crime have convinced most legislators, policymakers, practitioners, and other stakeholders
that eighteen may yet again be the appropriate
age for juvenile court jurisdiction.
Reformers face a difficult task. Transfer and
youth policy raise complex questions that are
not just about youth crime. Transfer is one
front in a longstanding tension between the
judiciary and other branches of government
during successive legislative efforts to control
crime. It is also an important symbolic front
in showing toughness on crime. The general
hostility toward judges that was evident in the
overall narrowing of judicial discretion—such

as the adoption of sentencing guidelines for
adults that set minimum or fixed sentences—
also extended to the juvenile court, where
measures to expand transfer curtailed judicial
discretion. The sharp restriction of judicial
authority in favor of enhanced prosecutorial
power (as in Proposition 21) or legislative
authority (as in the New York JO Law)
resulted in the expansion of prosecutorial
power at the expense of judicial authority.
The accretion of authority to prosecutors in
this regime is clear: the prosecutor has the
unreviewable discretion to select charges
and, in turn, to select jurisdiction. Although
direct file provisions offer some degree of
transparency, exclusion statutes (which
account for a large number of transfers)
offer none.

Restoring Principle to the
Transfer Debate
The debate about transfer to date has been
based neither on principle nor on policy, but
on the need for “toughness.”106 It is about the
substitution of toughness for principle. No
scholar or practitioner or advocate denies that
it is sometimes necessary to transfer some
adolescents to criminal court. The public
must be protected from dangerous youth
who are not likely to be helped by treatmentoriented or supervisory sanctions. An unrebuttable assumption of immaturity for all
robbery suspects younger than age eighteen
would be as silly as an unrebuttable assumption of their maturity at fourteen. But delinquent youth also must be protected from
the overreach of wholesale waiver. And the
reduced decision-making capacity of juveniles
provides a principled justification for finetuning the borders of the juvenile justice
system to avoid unnecessary risk.
Setting these boundaries poses a dilemma
for lawmakers that they simply ignore when
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they retreat to the simplistic overreach of
legislative exclusion or cede discretion to
(elected) prosecutors. Developing transfer
policy, both calibrating the threshold itself
and devising the mechanism for crossing it,
involves weighing competing risks. Two types
of error lie in wait. One is overpredicting
the likelihood of juveniles’ offending. The
other is underpredicting recidivism risks.
The two types of predictions are linked, and
evaluating waiver or transfer as public policy
requires considering both types of risk. Such
is the ethical responsibility of the regulator.107
Principles for transfer can produce hard
choices and conflicting results. A legislative
waiver regime may produce fewer racial disparities for youth under the criminal law than
does individual waiver by judges. But legislative waiver raises substantial risks and social
costs.108 Are longer sentences in the juvenile
court preferable to shorter sentences in the
criminal courts? When we pile on redundant
reforms—blended sentences, presumptive
transfer, longer juvenile court sentences—do
the cumulative and cascading effects produce
the intended consequences, or does some
less desirable outcome develop?
The future of reform depends on the prospects for restoring principle and discipline to
the legislative debate. The weight of evidence
points toward returning to juvenile court
judges the discretion to select juveniles for
transfer. The evidence also points toward
basing that selection on more criteria than
age and offense. Using Kent-like criteria and
new scientific knowledge of adolescent
development in an open and transparent
forum, judges, who are less influenced than
legislators by the politics of crime and by
electoral pressures, should be able to decide
which adolescents should be transferred.109 A
jurisprudence of discretionary decision
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making on transfer would also promote two
ancillary goals. It would restore the accountability that is diffused when legislators
surgically remove entire classes of offenders
from the juvenile court. And it would take
seriously the responsibility for mistakes on
both sides of the decision threshold.
Returning to discretionary transfer rather
than “wholesale waiver” also would minimize
harm by limiting the number of youth subjected to criminal court prosecution while
identifying those whose plasticity warrants
juvenile court intervention. Yet it would also
maintain proportional punishment for adolescents whose crimes are too serious to be
adjudicated in the juvenile court.
A now extensive portfolio of empirical
research suggests that past attempts to select
youth individually for transfer have often
failed to identify the most serious offenders
and have also reinforced racial discrimination.110 More careful screening is crucial.
New evidence on the dangers of wholesale
transfer suggests that the ethical regulator
must balance the risk of two types of error,
not just the risks of leniency that motivate
contemporary statutes and practices. Strong
commitments to transparency and ongoing
analysis of the patterns and rationales for
such decisions can enable judges and other
juvenile justice stakeholders to calibrate
where the borders should be set and to track
and measure the performance of those making transfer decisions.
Declining crime rates, the intellectual and
political exhaustion of the “toughness” paradigm in juvenile justice, and new gains in the
science of adolescent development have converged to create an opportunity for reform.
Opening the transfer process to regulation
and deliberation can lay the foundation for

Juvenile Crime and Criminal Justice: Resolving Border Disputes

more effective and principled policies. While
the law has moved toward waiving increasingly younger teens to adult criminal court,

social and biological evidence suggests moving
in the other direction. Perhaps it’s time for the
law to change course and follow the science.
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